State of Utah v. Troy Gartrell : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
State of Utah v. Troy Gartrell : Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David Paul White; Attorney for Appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Charlene Barlow; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Respondent.
DAVID PAUL WHITE 144 South 500 East Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 Attorney for Appellant
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) Attorney General CHARLENE BARLOW (0212) Assistant Attorney
General 236 State Capitol Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 Attorneys for Respondent
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Gartrell, No. 890444 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2044
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KF-U 
BRIEF 
50 
•A10 syQ I] 
DOCKET NO. T S I ^ C X J V 
N THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
TROY GARTRELL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 890444-CA 
DEPOSITED BY TUT 
Category No. 2 STATE OF UTAH 
AUG171990 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR DISTRIBUTION OF 
A CONNTROLLED SUBSTANCE, COCAINE, A SECOND 
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (SUPP. 1989), IN THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN, JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW (0212) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
DAVID PAUL WHITE 
144 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Appellant 
F I L E D 
JAN 1 1 1990 
MaryT Neonen 
Cterk of SN* Court 
Utah Court <ri Appeals 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 890444-CA 
v. : 
TROY GARTRELL, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR DISTRIBUTION OF 
A CONNTROLLED SUBSTANCE, COCAINE, A SECOND 
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (SUPP. 1989), IN THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN, JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW (0212) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
DAVID PAUL WHITE 
144 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 9 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN SETTING THE TIME FOR 
THE HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 11 
A. Waiver 11 
B. Court's Discretion to Continue 
Hearing 12 
POINT II THE TRIAL COURT IN THIS MATTER PROPERLY 
UPHELD THE SEARCH WARRANT AND ADMITTED 
THE EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO THE 
WARRANT 15 
POINT III THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
THE ADDRESS OF THE PREMISES TO BE 
SEARCHED WAS ADEQUATE AND THAT THE 
RESIDENCE ACTUALLY SEARCHED WAS THE 
CORRECT RESIDENCE BASED ON THE OFFICER'S 
OBSERVATIONS 25 
POINT IV THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL AMPLY 
SUPPORTS THE JURY'S VERDICT CONVICTING 
DEFENDANT 28 
CONCLUSION 34 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Cambelt International Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 
1239 (Utah 1987) 29 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) 19 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) 16 
In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989). 30 
Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake 
County, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976) 13 
State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985) 16, 25 
State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983) 16, 24 
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987) 20 
State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982) 13 
State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337 (Utah 1977) 13 
State v. Fort, 572 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977) 17 
State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) 28, 30 
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987) 17-18, 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989) 11 
State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980) 29 
State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980) 28 
State v. Mclntire, 768 P.2d 970 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) 25-27 
State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Utah Ct.App.), 
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (1987) 16 
State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1936), cert. 
denied, Nielsen v. Utah, 480 U.S. 930 (1987) 19-20, 
State v. Stromberq, 121 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah Ct. 
App. November 8, 1989) 18, 20 
State v. Tapp, 26 Utah 2d 392, 490 P.2d 334 (1971) 17, 24 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1937) 11 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989) 29 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987) 30 
Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925).. 26, 30 
United States v. Dill, 693 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir. 
1982) 17 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1989)... 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f) (Supp. 1989) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §78-7-5 (Supp. 1989) 12 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35-12 (1982) 12 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12 12 
-iii-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
TROY GARTRELL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 890444-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction for distribution of a 
controlled substance, cocaine, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1989). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(f) (Supp. 1989) because the appeal is from a 
district court in a criminal case involving a second degree 
felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when 
it set the suppression hearing for the first day set for trial 
and whether defendant waived this claim of error by failing to 
timely object to that setting. 
2. Whether the trial court correctly found that 
discrepancies found in the affidavit supporting the search 
warrant were not material; and whether the excision of erroneous 
material and the insertion of omitted material vitiated the 
original finding of probable cause. 
3. Whether the trial court correctly found that the 
discrepancy in the address given on the affidavit did not 
preclude the officers from searching the correct residence and 
did not make the search illegal. 
4. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the 
jury's verdict convicting defendant. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies are included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with distribution of a controlled 
substance, cocaine, on April 19, 1988 (Record [hereinafter R.] at 
23-24). He filed a motion to suppress evidence on January 13, 
1989, noticing it for hearing on January 20, 1989, "or as soon 
thereafter as counsel may be heard before the Honorable Pat 
Brian" (R. at 26-27). Defendant filed a memorandum in support of 
his motion to suppress evidence on February 2, 1989 (R. at 29-
38). The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the 
motion to suppress on February 6, 1989, and denied the motion (R. 
at 47, 75-79 and 111). Defendant renewed the motion at trial and 
it was again denied (R. 112 at 59-60). 
Defendant was tried by jury on February 6, 7 and 8, 
1989, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, the Honorable Pat B. Brian, district judge, presiding, 
and was found guilty as charged (R. at 46-49, 67 and 112). After 
a 90-day diagnostic evaluation, Judge Barian sentenced defendant 
on July 14, 1989, to a term of one to fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison, and fined him $10,000, plus surcharge (R. at 92 and 
106). Defendant filed a notice of appeal on July 14, 1989 (R. at 
104). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
As part of ongoing drug enforcement activity, members 
of the Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force participated in the 
purchase of cocaine from an individual named Les Dowdle (R. Ill 
at 7 and R. 112 at 19-20, 194). When faced with criminal charges 
as a result of the cocaine sale, Dowdle agreed to assist the 
officers in pursuing other distributors of controlled substances 
(R. Ill at 7-8 and R. 112 at 20-21, 194). Dowdle supplied the 
name of Kevin Gartrell as someone who was involved in illegal 
drug trafficking (R. Ill at 8 and R. 112 at 21, 194). At the 
officers' direction, Dowdle contacted Kevin Gartrell and his 
wife, Kathy (R. Ill at 8 and R. 112 at 21-22, 195). 
Under the supervision of Officer Lon F. Brian, Dowdle 
arranged to purchase cocaine from Kevin Gartrell on March 11, 
1988 (R. Ill at 9 and R. 112 at 23). On that date, Dowdle gave 
money, which had been provided and recorded by the Strike Force, 
to Kevin Gartrell who then went to Salt Lake City to secure the 
drug (R. Ill at 10-11 and R. 112 at 24-26). As arranged during a 
phone call from Kevin Gartrell, Dowdle again met with Kevin and 
received the cocaine, then turned it over to the officers (R. Ill 
at 12 and R. 112 at 27-29). Further contacts were made between 
Gartrell to set another purchase of cocaine (R. Ill at 13 and R. 
112 at 29). 
During the period of March 16 through 25, 1988, Kevin 
and Kathy Gartrell told Dowdle that their supplier "was 
available, but was extremely paranoid at this time, was preparing 
to go to a vacation, or a trip to Mazatlan." (R. Ill at 13). 
Kathy told Dowdle that she and Kevin did not keep the cocaine at 
their house because "someone close to them — that things had 
been real hot, and she had to clean her house out." She also 
told Dowdle that "it [cocaine] is too dangerous for them to have 
on hand, that they can't stay out of it," (R. 112 at 2C5). 
On March 25, 1988, Kathy Gartrell contacted Dowdle, 
saying that the supplier was back in town and Kathy and Kevin 
could now obtain the cocaine (R. Ill at 14). Dowdle informed the 
officers and a meeting was set up for Dowdle to give money to 
Kevin and Kathy Gartrell for the purchase of cocaine (R. Ill at 
14 and R. 112 at 35). Dowdle gave the money to the Gartrells; 
officers then followed them to an apartment complex near 45th 
South and 7th East in the Salt Lake metropolitan area (R. Ill at 
14 and R. 112 at 36). Parked next to the Gartrells' vehicle at 
the complex was a car which was registered to defendant (R. Ill 
at 15 and R. 112 at 37). As had been arranged between Dowdle and 
the Gartrells, the Gartrells called Dowdle from the apartment 
complex and told him that they had the cocaine and were returning 
to Farmington to deliver it to him (R. Ill at 15 and R. 112 at 
37-38). The cocaine was given to Dowdle by the Gartrells at 
their residence in Farmington (R. Ill at 16 and R. 112 at 38). 
Officers checked the mailboxes at the apartment complex 
where the Gartrells had been and found that one had the name 
Gartrell on it (R. Ill at 16). Based on the information which 
they had gathered, officers surmised that Kevin and Kathy 
Gartrell were obtaining the drugs from defendant (R. Ill at 17). 
Arrangements were made for Dowdle to make a third purchase from 
Kevin and Kathy with officers setting up surveillance on the 
apartment complex at 45th South and 7th East (R. 112 at 39). 
Following the procedures which had been set up in the 
previous buys, on March 30, 1988, Dowdle gave money (the serial 
numbers of which had been recorded by Officer Brian) to Kathy for 
the purchase of cocaine (R. Ill at 18 and R. 112 at 40-42). As 
on the previous occasions, Dowdle and his vehicle were searched 
and found to be devoid of controlled substances (R. 112 at 42). 
Officer Brian monitored Dowdle's activities through the use of a 
microphone which was attached to Dowdle (R. Ill at 19 and R. 112 
at 41) . 
After the money was given to Kathy, Officer Brian 
maintained surveillance on her home. When he saw her leave, he, 
along with Officer Rapp, followed her (R. Ill at 20 and R. 112 at 
42-44). The officers followed her to a gasoline station and then 
on to 1-15 southbound and into the Salt Lake area (R. Ill at 21-
23 and R. 112 at 44-46). She exited 1-15 at 21st South westbound 
and was followed to 2050 West and 31st South by Officer Rapp (R. 
Ill at 24-25 and R. 112 at 47). He broke off surveillance in 
order not to be seen by Kathy (R. 112 az 135-36). 
Approximately one to two minutes later, Officer Brian 
saw Kathy's vehicle at a duplex located at 3216-3218 South 2040 
West in West Valley City (R. Ill at 25 and R. 112 at 47-48). One 
of the other vehicles parked at the duplex, a Ford Bronco, was 
registered to defendant (R. Ill at 39-40). Officer Brian parked, 
watched the area for a time, and then received notification that 
Kathy had telephoned Dowdle about having obtained the drug (R. 
Ill at 28-31 and R. 112 at 48-49). That telephone call had been 
prearranged in Farmington at the time Dowdle had given Kathy the 
money (R. Ill at 30 and R. 112 at 50). Approximately 27 minutes 
later, Officer Brian saw Kathy leave the east side of the duplex 
with her two children and three bags (R. Ill at 32 and R. 112 at 
51-52). Kathy placed the red and the green bags (which appeared 
to be diaper bags) in the trunk of her car, placed the blue bag 
in the front of the car, and secured he:: children in the car (R. 
Ill at 32 and R. 112 at 52). She then went briefly to the west 
unit where someone came out of that uni': and moved a car which 
had been parked behind Kathy's, blocking her exit (R. Ill at 32 
and R. 112 at 52-53). 
Kathy was followed back to Farmington, but evidently 
became suspicious of the behavior of Officer Rapp who was 
following her (R. Ill at 34-35 and R. 112 at 137). She told 
Dowdle, who was arriving at her house to pick up the cocaine as 
she had instructed him to, that she thought that she had been 
followed (R. 112 at 198). She also called defendant who then 
telephoned another customer, Mark Mori, and asked him if he had 
been followed as well (R. 112 at 105-106). Kathy left her house 
with the children and possibly pulled into the municipal court 
parking lot for a period of time (R. 112 at 198). Officer Brian 
waited at the onramp of 1-15 in order not to further arouse 
Kathy's suspicions (R. Ill at 36 and R. 112 at 54). 
When Kathy drove back to the interstate and entered it 
travelling southbound, the officers decided to stop and arrest 
her (R. Ill at 36 and R. 112 at 54). They stopped her vehicle at 
the Centerville exit; Officer Brian looked into the trunk of 
Kathy's car and found the same red and green bags that he had 
seen her put into the trunk at the West Valley duplex (R. Ill at 
37 and R. 112 at 55-56). In the red diaper bag was a set of 
Ohaus triple-beam balance scales and a baggy with approximately a 
quarter ounce of rock cocaine in it (R. Ill at 38 and R. 112 at 
56). Kathy told Officer Brian that she had been at the home of 
her brother-in-law, Troy Gartrell (R. Ill at 38-39). She also 
subsequently told Brian the procedure that she and defendant 
usually followed when she was obtaining cocaine from defendant 
(R. Ill at 39). 
Based on these observations and statements, coupled 
with other information obtained previously, Officer Brian 
obtained a search warrant for the east side of the duplex at 
3216-3218 South 2050 West, West Valley City (R. Ill at 40-42 and 
R. 112 at 57). Officer Brian accompanied the officers to the 
address to make sure that they entered the correct residence, but 
then left to fulfill other obligations (R. Ill at 43 and R. 112 
at 57). Items seized in the duplex confirmed the officers' 
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While Officer Rapp was searching the closet in the 
master bedroom of the duplex, a large amount of cash fell out of 
the clothing and landed at his feet (R. 112 at 142). A count 
determined that this packet contained $6600.00 (R. 112 at 145). 
Officer Rapp found an additional $1500.00 in the front pouch of a 
t-shirt (R. 112 at 144). This t-shirt came from Mazatlan (R. 112 
at 144). Officer Brian later went through the packet of money 
and found $220.00 of the recorded buy money which had been given 
to Kathy by Dowdle (R. 112 at 66). The balance of the buy money, 
$140.00, was found in Kathy Gartrellfs blue bag (R. 112 at 66). 
Also testifying for the State at trial was Mark Mori, 
who was serving time at the Juab County Jail for possession of a 
controlled substance (R. 112 at 100). He was at defendant's home 
when Kathy purchased the cocaine on March 30, 1988 (R. 112 at 
102). He was there to pay defendant for drugs that he had 
received earlier (R. 112 at 112). He knew that drugs were 
present in the duplex and saw defendant weighing out a quantity 
in Kathy's presence (R. 112 at 102-103). He did not see 
defendant actually hand the drugs to Ka^hyf but he did see Kathy 
put the scale used for weighing the drugs into the red bag (R. 
112 at 104-105). After he returned home, Mor.i received a 
telephone call from defendant asking if he had been followed and 
telling Mori that Kathy had seen someone following her (R. 112 at 
105, 107). Defendant gave Mori a license plate number and asked 
him to contact a friend of Mori's who worked for the State and 
ask the friend to find out to whom the car was registered (R. 112 
at 106). Defendant called Mori again later and said that 
-8-
defendant's house had been raided but that he had gone next door 
and was not home during the search (R. 112 at 106-107). 
Defendant told Mori that the officers had found money in his 
shirt (R. 112 at 107). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant has waived his first claim of error. After 
trial was set, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence 
seized during the execution of the search warrant. The record is 
silent as to why the motion was scheduled for the first day of 
the trial setting, but it is also silent as to any objection by 
defendant about the setting of the time for hearing on his 
motion. Because defendant did not interpose a timely objection 
to the setting of the hearing, he has waived any claim of error 
on this point. 
Even if defendant had not waived this claim, it is 
without merit. The trial court has discretion to conduct its 
calendar in an orderly fashion; as long as the court does not 
abuse its discretion, this Court should not disturb the trial 
court's decision. Neither does defendant's claim that he was 
prejudiced by the setting have merit. His only complaint is that 
he had to prepare for trial assuming that all of the seized 
evidence would be admitted. Had the hearing been held earlier, 
with presumably the same result, defendant would still have had 
to prepare to defend against all of the evidence. Defendant's 
implication that an earlier hearing would have limited the 
evidence that he had to prepare for is not supported by the 
decision of the trial court. The trial court denied the motion 
and did not express any early concerns about the admissibility of 
the evidence which could have altered how defendant prepared for 
trial. 
The trial court's ruling rega3:ding the materiality of 
the discrepancies between the information in the search warrant 
affidavit and the testimony at the suppression hearing is 
correct. If the erroneous information is deleted from the 
affidavit and the correct information inserted, the probable 
cause finding by the magistrate is still upheld. Defendant's 
claim that "gaps" in the surveillance negated the probable cause 
finding is frivolous in the face of case law defining probable 
cause for a warrant. 
The trial court's ruling regarding the address in the 
affidavit was also correct. The difference between the address 
of the residence searched and that given in the affidavit was a 
minor technicality which did not invalidate the search. The 
officers were able to ascertain the accurate 3:esidence to search 
and the search was conducted of the correct residence. 
The evidence produced at trial supported the verdict of 
the jury. Defendant's sister-in-law received money (the serial 
numbers of which had been recorded) from a confidential informant 
to buy cocaine; she then travelled to defendant's residence in 
the Salt Lake area. She had told the informant that she would 
get the cocaine from Salt Lake and call when she had obtained it; 
she called while in defendant's house. Defendant was observed in 
his residence weighing out cocaine in the presence of his sister-
in-law and cocaine was found in a bag which she was seen carrying 
from defendant's residence. The search of defendant's residence 
turned up a large sum of cash, among which was part of the buy 
money which had been given to defendant's sister-in-law. This 
evidence fully supports the jury verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN SETTING THE TIME FOR THE HEARING ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
A. Waiver 
Defendant's first claim of error is that the trial 
court abused its discretion when it held the hearing on his 
motion to suppress evidence the morning of the first day of the 
trial setting, before the jury was called. A reading of the 
record reveals that defendant never objected at the trial court 
level to the setting of the hearing. As the Utah Supreme Court 
said in State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989): 
First, as we have repeatedly stated, "A 
general rule of appellate review in criminal 
cases in Utah is that a contemporaneous 
objection or some form of specific 
preservation of claims of error must be made 
a part of the trial court record before an 
appellate court will review such claim on 
appeal." 
Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1144 (emphasis in original) (quoting State 
v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987)). 
In the present case, arraignment was held on December 
2, 1988, at which time a pretrial was set for January 20, 1989, 
and trial was set to begin February 6, 1989 (R. at 25). On 
January 13, 1989, defense counsel signed a motion to suppress 
evidence and notice of hearing on the motion which set the 
hearing for "January 20, 1989 at the hour of 1:30 p.m. or as soon 
thereafter as counsel may be heard before the Honorable Pat 
Brian." (R. at 26-28). Interestingly, this motion is stamped as 
filed with the court on January 26, 1989, well after the date 
which had been noticed up as the hearing date (R. at 26). 
Nothing in the file indicates whether the pretrial was held and 
whether defendant objected to the motion not being heard that 
day. The next court entry indicates only that the suppression 
hearing was held and that the motion was denied (R. at 47). The 
transcript of the suppression hearing does not indicate any (even 
belated) objection to the hearing being set for the time 
immediately before trial (R. 111). Since defendant did not 
object at the trial court level to the time of the setting of the 
suppression hearing, he has waived any right to claim error on 
that ground before this Court. 
B. Court's Discretion to Continue Hearing 
Motions, such as the one made in this case, concerning 
the admissibility of evidence are goverjied by Rule 12 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Utah Code Ann. § 78-35-12 (1982). 
In pertinent part, that rule reads: 
(c) A motion made before trial shall be 
determined before trial unless the court for 
good cause orders that the ruling be deferred 
for later determination. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35-12(c) (1982). Inherent in the general 
powers of the courts is the concept that the regulation of the 
time of hearings is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court. As is stated in Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5 (Supp. 1989): 
Every court has authority to: 
• • • 
(3) provide for the orderly conduct of 
proceedings before it or its officers[.] 
Defendant complains that the suppression hearing was 
continued although the record does not demonstrate a continuance. 
If the trial court did continue the hearing (as opposed to merely 
setting the hearing originally for February 6), 
[i]t is well established in U~ah, as 
elsewhere, that the granting of a continuance 
is at the discretion of the trial judge, 
whose decision will not be reversed by this 
Court absent a clear abuse of that 
discretion. State v. Moosman, Utah, 542 P.2d 
1093 (1975). 
State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982). Discretionary 
decisions by the trial court enjoy a high degree of deference 
when subsequently challenged. "[A]s in all discretionary 
matters, due to his prerogatives and his advantaged position, the 
trial court is allowed considerable latitude in the exercise of 
that discretion, which the appellate court will not interfere 
with unless it plainly appears that there was abuse thereof." 
State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1977) (emphasis added). 
The trial court's rulings are not to be disturbed absent a 
showing that it exceeded its authority or acted so beyond reason 
that its action must be deemed arbitrary or capricious. Peatross 
v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281, 284 
(Utah 1976) . 
In the case at bar, defendant has not demonstrated that 
the trial court exceeded its authority or was arbitrary or 
capricious in its actions. As indicated above, the record is not 
entirely clear that defendant's motion and notice of hearing were 
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filed in a timely manner; in fact, if the filing stamp is 
correct, they were not. In addition, defendant's notice was for 
a hearing on January 20, 1989, or as soon thereafter as the 
matter could be heard. Evidently, the trial court found that the 
matter could not be heard until February 6, 1989, and the court 
exercised its authority in scheduling the hearing for the soonest 
available time. The motion was determined before trial as 
mandated by Rule 12. Defendant has not demonstrated that the 
trial court abused its discretion in seating the suppression 
hearing for the first day of the trial setting. 
Defendant's claims of prejudice are equally frivolous. 
Defendant claims that he was prejudiced because he could not 
properly prepare for trial because he did not know beforehand 
whether any evidence would be excluded. This argument is totally 
without merit. Defendant was aware of all of the evidence which 
was going to be offered at trial. Nothing precluded him from 
preparing his case as if all of that evidence were going to be 
admitted. At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, 
defendant's motion was denied and defendant psroceeded to trial 
knowing that none of the evidence had been excluded (R. Ill at 
143). Holding the hearing just before trial did not bar counsel 
from preparing to rebut the evidence. Had the hearing been held 
on January 20, 1989, the result from the trial court would have 
been the same, and defendant would have had to prepare to face 
all of the evidence just as he had to when the hearing was held 
later. Counsel apparently hoped that the trial court would have 
given him "a strong indication of the trial court's concerns 
about the evidence at question. Knowing the court's concerns, 
said defense counsel could then more adequately prepare to deal 
with the evidence at time of trial." (Brief of Appellant 
[hereinafter Br. of App.] at 9). The trial court clearly did not 
have any concerns about the evidence in question; thus, an 
earlier hearing would not have accomplished counsel's hoped-for 
end of narrowing his focus of preparation (R. Ill at 138-43). 
Defendant also implies that the suppression hearing 
immediately before trial somehow placed a self-imposed time 
constraint on the trial court which deprived defendant of a full 
hearing on his suppression motion. This claim is also without 
merit. The transcript of the suppression hearing runs 143 pages 
and clearly demonstrates that defendant was able to exhaustively 
challenge the search warrant and the admissibility of the 
evidence in this matter. While the trial couart did try to focus 
counsel on the issue before the court and asked counsel for both 
parties to concentrate on relevant matters, the court did not 
unduly limit the questioning in this matter (R. Ill at 108, 110, 
113-14). Defendant was able to fully present his case in 
challenging the evidence before trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT IN THIS MATTER PROPERLY 
UPHELD THE SEARCH WARRANT AND ADMITTED THE 
EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO THE WARRANT. 
Defendant next contends that the affiant included false 
information in the search warrant executed on defendant's house 
and that the excision of that "false" material negates the 
probable cause upon which the warrant was based. Defendant cites 
both the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution as the basis for 
his claim, but he does not distinguish between the two in his 
analysis. In this response, the State will also treat the two 
provisions jointly. 
In a previous case, this Cour*:. said:: 
The fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article one, section 
fourteen of the Utah Constitution both 
require a finding of "probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation" prior to 
issuance of a search warrant. 
State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). The appellate courts of this 
state have consistently followed the holding of the United States 
Supreme Court regarding 
the test to determine whether an affidavit 
establishes the necessary probable cause: 
The task of the issuing magistrate is 
simply to make a practical, commonsense 
decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit 
before him, including the 'veracity' and 
'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying 
hearsay information, there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of 
a crime will be found in a particular 
place. And the duty of a reviewing court 
is simply to ensure that the magistrate 
had a 'substantial basis for . . . 
conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed. 
Id. at 238-39 (quoting Jones v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 . . . (1960). 
Miller, 740 P.2d at 1365 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 238-39 (1983)). See also State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 
1261 (Utah 1983), and State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1101 
(Utah 1985) (adopting the Gates "totality of the circumstances" 
standard for reviewing affidavits for search warrants). 
It is axiomatic that the affiant to an affidavit for a 
search warrant does not have to establish certain knowledge that 
contraband or evidence will be found at a certain location. As 
the Utah Supreme Court said in State v. Tapp, 26 Utah 2d 392, 490 
P.2d 334 (1971): 
It is not necessary that the affiant have 
certain knowledge of the commission of crime 
or of the location of evidence incident 
thereto. It is only required that there be 
sufficient knowledge of the probability 
thereof that a person of reason and prudence 
would act thereon. 
Tapp, 490 P.2d at 337 (footnote omitted). See also United States 
v. Dill, 693 F.2d 1012, 1014 (10th Cir. 1982) ("Probable cause 
for a search warrant is nothing more than a reasonable belief 
that the evidence sought is located at the place indicated by the 
policeman's affidavit."). 
More recently, the Utah Supreme Court defined the 
standard of probable cause for a search warrant in State v. Fort, 
572 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977). The Court said: 
In regard to the sufficiency of the search 
warrant, the affidavit in support thereof may 
be based on hearsay providing there is a 
showing of underlying circumstances 
justifying a conclusion of the informant's 
reliability and credibility, and the 
probability, not a prima facie showing, of 
criminal activity is the standard of probable 
cause for issuance of a search warrant. 
Fort, 572 P.2d at 1389 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). The 
role of courts in reviewing the sufficiency of affidavits has 
been addressed by this Court and by the Utah Supreme Court. In 
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987), the Supreme Court 
said: 
Under the accepted standard o:: review, the 
issue is whether the magistrate had a 
substantial basis to conclude that in the 
totality of the circumstances, the affidavit 
adequately established probable cause for the 
issuance of a search warrant. 
Hansen, 732 P.2d at 129 (citations omitted). This Court 
addressed the standard of review in State v. Stromberg, 121 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah Ct. App. November 8, 1989) . The Court 
elucidated the standard: 
When a search warrant is subsequently 
challenged on the grounds that it was issued 
without the requisite probable cause, as in 
this case, "the fourth amendment does not 
require that the reviewing court conduct a de 
novo review of the magistrates' probable 
cause determination." [State v.1 Babbell, 770 
P.2d [987] at 991 [(Utah 1989)]. Rather, the 
determination is "whether the magistrate had 
a substantial basis to conclude that in the 
totality of circumstances the affidavit 
adequately established probable cause for the 
issuance of a search warrant." State v. 
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1987). 
Moreover, in making this determination, the 
reviewing court is to give the magistrate's 
decision "great deference." Jd. (quoting 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 236). 
Our role in reviewing that determination is 
limited: "Because a trial court is in an 
advantageous position to assess witness 
credibility, 'we will not disturb its factual 
assessment underlying a decision to . . . 
deny a suppression motion unless it clearly 
appears that the lower court was in error.'" 
[State v.] Droneberg, 120 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 
28 [(Utah Ct. App. October 20, 1989)] 
(quoting State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 
(Utah 1987)). Clear error is indicated when 
the trial court's factual assessment is 
against the clear weight of the evidence or 
induces a firm conviction that a mistake has 
been committed. Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258. 
Stromberg, 121 Utah Adv. Rep. at 23. 
Defendant's first specific claim is that the affiant in 
this case included "materially false statements" in the affidavit 
supporting the search warrant for defendant's residence (Br, of 
App. at 10). The leading case in Utah on this issue is State v. 
Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), cert, denied, Nielsen v. Utah, 
480 U.S. 930 (1987). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court, 
citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), said: 
In Franks, the United States Supreme Court 
held that a defendant is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing to challenge the validity 
of a search warrant if the defendant can 
establish that (i) an affiant in an affidavit 
supporting a search warrant made a false 
statement intentionally, knowingly, or with 
reckless disregard for the truth, and (ii) 
the affidavit is insufficient to support a 
finding of probable cause after the 
misstatement is set aside. 483 U.S. 171-72. 
By an extension of reasoning, the same test 
applies when a misstatement occurs because 
information is omitted; the affidavit must be 
evaluated to determine if it will support a 
finding of probable cause when the omitted 
information is inserted, . . . If an 
affidavit fails to support a finding of 
probable cause after the false statements are 
excised or the omitted information is added, 
i.e., if the omission or misstatement 
materially affects the finding of probable 
cause, any evidence obtained under the 
improperly issued warrant must be suppressed. 
Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191 (citations omitted). In the present 
case, the trial court correctly determined that the minor 
discrepancies found in the affidavit did not vitiate the 
magistrate's finding of probable cause for issuance of the 
warrant. 
In this case, the search warrant was issued by a 
magistrate in Layton based on a detailed affidavit sworn to by 
Officer Lon F. Brian. (R. at 41-45, a copy of the affidavit is 
attached as Addendum A). Defendant filed a motion to suppress 
the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant and a full hearing on 
the motion was held by District Judge Pat B. Brian (R. at 26-47 
and 111). At the hearing, Officer Brian testified, as did Deputy 
Davis County Attorney Brian Namba (R. aJ: 47 and 111). At the 
conclusion of the hearing, Judge Brian entered findings of fact 
and conclusions of law based on the evidence presented, and 
denied the motion (R. at 75-79 and 111 at 138-43, a copy of the 
trial court's findings and conclusions is attached as Addendum 
B). This procedure complies with the requirements of Nielsen and 
Stromberg; thus, this Court should accord great deference to 
findings of the trial court. As will be set out below, the trial 
court did not err in its ruling; its factual assessment is not 
against the clear weight of the evidence, nor does it induce a 
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Ashe, 745 
P.2d at 1258. 
Citing Nielsen, defendant specifically challenges two 
paragraphs of the affidavit supporting the search warrant and 
claims that they contain false statements which, when excised, 
leave the affidavit insufficient to support a finding of probable 
cause. The Court in Nielsen did not require just an excision of 
false material, but also required insertion of material which may 
have been omitted from the affidavit. Then, with that excision 
or insertion, the "affidavit must be evaluated to determine if it 
will support a finding of probable cause". Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 
191. 
The first paragraph about which defendant complains is 
paragraph 8 of the affidavit. This paragraph reads: 
8. That affiant observed Cathey Gartrell 
drive directly to a duplex located at 3218 
South 2050 West, West Valley City, Utah[,] 
and that affiant was able to observe her the 
whole way and the only stop she made was at a 
gas station in Farmington, Utah[,] where she 
filled her car with gas. 
(R. at 43). The first phrase is correct; Kathy Gartrell drove 
directly to the duplex. (It should be noted that Kathy's name is 
spelled in various fashions in the record; Kathy is the spelling 
in the transcript and will be used generally in this brief). 
Defendant challenges that first phrase of the paragraph, claiming 
that Kathy could have stopped along the way when the officers 
following her lost sight of her for a short time period. The 
trial judge found, after hearing the evidence at the suppression 
hearing, 
[t]hat the times and the circumstances under 
which the surveillance was interrupted were 
so brief and so out of context with the 
overall events that were occurring[,] that 
Cathy Gartrell would not have had opportunity 
to go elsewhere in those brief periods of 
time for the purpose of picking up drugs and 
narcotics. 
(R. at 76-77). It is clear from the transcript that this finding 
by the judge is supported by the record and is not clearly 
erroneous. (R. Ill at 23-26, 63-66). Thus, this Court should 
not disturb that finding. 
The trial court found, based on the testimony of 
Officer Brian, that the phrase "that affiant was able to observe 
her the whole way" was inaccurate. (R. at 76, paragraph 4). 
However, the trial court found that this inaccuracy did not 
vitiate the finding of probable cause. Under Nielsen, the 
reviewing court must excise false information and insert omitted 
information. Applying that to the present case, the trial court 
could have modified paragraph 8 of the affidavit to read: 
8. That affiant and another officer 
observed Cathey Gartrell drive to 2050 West 
3100 South, West Valley City, Utah, during 
which time the officers lost contact for one 
to two minutes. Contact was reestablished 
with Cathey's vehicle at approximately 3215 
South 2050 West, West Valley City, within two 
minutes, when affiant observed the car parked 
in front of a duplex at 3216 and 3218 South 
2050 West. The only stop observed by the 
officers prior to her arrival in West Valley 
City was at a gas station in 7armington, 
Utah, where she filled her car with gas. 
This paragraph is based on the testimony of Officer Brian and 
excises any inaccurate information and includes other information 
which was omitted from the affidavit. (R. at 23-26) (The issue of 
the discrepancy between the address of 2050 West and 2040 West 
has not been altered in this paragraph; it will be treated 
separately in the next point). Clearly this corrected paragraph 
still supports a finding of probable cause such that any 
omissions or misstatements in the original did not materially 
affect the finding of probable cause. Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191. 
The trial court did not err in ruling that the discrepancies were 
not material to the finding of probable cause. (R. at 76-77, 
paragraphs 4-5). 
Defendant's second contention is that paragraph 15 
contains false statements which invalidate the probable cause 
finding. This paragraph reads: 
15. Statement from Paul Rapp that he 
observed Cathey Gartrell leave her home in 
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Farmington and[,] after stopping for a short 
time in the parking lot of the Davis County 
Municipal Court Building[,] enter the 1-15 
freeway heading south. 
(R. at 44). At the suppression hearing, Officer Brian testified 
that Officer Rapp told him that Officer Rapp followed Kathy 
Gartrell back to Farmington. By the time that they reached 
Farmington, Officer Rapp said that Kathy had seen him using his 
police radio and that he felt that she had identified him as a 
police officer. Kathy had even contacted the police informant 
and told him that she thought she was under police surveillance. 
She left her home and went to the parking lot of the municipal 
building for a time, then she headed back to the freeway (R. Ill 
at 35). Officer Brian had parked his vehicle at the on ramp to 
1-15 in order to not alert Kathy further. He saw her entering 
the on ramp a short time after he was told that she had gone to 
the municipal parking lot. Shortly thereafter, the officers 
decided to stop and arrest Kathy (R. Ill at 36). Based on that 
evidence, which was presented at the suppression hearing, the 
trial judge ruled that the interruptions in surveillance were so 
brief that they did not materially affect the finding of probable 
cause (R. 76-77, paragraph 5). 
Defendant's challenge to the truthfulness of paragraph 
15 is not based on the evidence adduced at the suppression 
hearing, but on the evidence presented at trial. At trial, 
Officer Rapp testified that he followed Kathy to her home in 
Farmington, then broke off surveillance because he felt that she 
had determined that he was following her (R. 112 at 153). 
Officer Rapp did not see her leave the house and ao to the* 
municipal parking lot (R. 112 at 153-54). However, the 
confidential informant, Les Dowdle, did observe Kathy leave her 
house* He drove up as she was leaving and she told him that she 
thought she had been followed and that he was to wait there. He 
watched her in the rear view mirror of his car and thought that 
she had turned in to the municipal parking lot (R. 112 at 198). 
Following the dictates of the Supreme Court in Nielsen, 
this Court can either excise paragraph 15 completely or modify it 
to read that Officer Rapp or Les Dowdle reported that Les Dowdle 
observed Kathy drive away from her home and pull into the 
municipal parking lot (R. 112 at 198-99). Either deleting the 
paragraph or modifying it to read that Dowdle saw Kathy leave 
does not materially affect the finding of probable cause. 
Defendant maintains that the "gaps" in surveillance 
negate the probable cause finding based on the affidavit. The 
trial court ruled against him on that issue and that ruling is 
supported by the evidence. The affidavit as a whole clearly 
supports the issuance of the search warrant. Defendant's 
challenge of two small discrepancies in the evidence of the 
surveillance does not neutralize the overwhelming information 
presented in the affidavit. Looking at the total affidavit, as 
required by case law, it is clear that the information supported 
the probability that contraband and evidence of illegal activity 
would be found at the duplex to which the officers had followed 
Kathy. State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1253, 1260-61 (Utah 1983); 
State v. Tapp, 26 Utah 2d 392, 490 P.2d 334, 337 (1971). 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE 
ADDRESS OF THE PREMISES TO BE SEARCHED WAS 
ADEQUATE AND THAT THE RESIDENCE ACTUALLY 
SEARCHED WAS THE CORRECT RESIDENCE BASED ON 
THE OFFICER'S OBSERVATIONS. 
Defendant next maintains that the search warrant relied 
on in this case was illegal because the warrant and accompanying 
affidavit both spoke of the area to be searched as 
apartment located in a duplex described as 
the East unit of the duplex with an address 
of either 3216 or 3218 South 2050 West[,] 
West Valley City and occupied by Troy 
Gartrellf.] 
(R. at 41). Defendant claims, and presented evidence at the 
suppression hearing to support the claim, that the west 
coordinate for the duplex is 2040 West (R. Ill at 109). While 
defendant challenges the address given on both the warrant and 
the affidavit, only the affidavit is in the record on appeal (R. 
at 41-45). This Court does not have the warrant before it to 
determine what address was on the warrant itself; however, 
Officer Brian, at the suppression hearing, agjreed with defense 
counsel that the address on the warrant was 2050 West (R. Ill at 
109) . 
The appellate courts of this state have addressed the 
issue of the adequacy of a description in a search warrant in 
State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985), and State v. 
Mclntire, 768 P.2d 970 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In Anderson, the 
Utah Supreme Court said: 
The adequacy of a description in a search 
warrant depends in every instance upon the 
particular facts of the case. In Steele v. 
Court described the standard by which the 
adequacy of a description mus^ c be judged: 
"It is enough if the description is such that 
the officer with a search warrant can with 
reasonable effort ascertain and identify the 
place intended." 
Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1102 (quoting Steele v. United States, 267 
U.S. 498, 503 (1925) with emphasis added by the Utah court) 
(footnotes omitted). Following that reasoning, this Court in 
Mclntire said: 
Whether the description in a search warrant 
is adequate depends upon the particular 
circumstances. State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 
1099, 1102 (Utah 1985). The description is 
sufficient if the officer executing the 
search warrant can with reasonable effort 
ascertain and identify the place to be 
searched. Id. 
Mclntire, 768 P.2d at 972. In the present case, the officers 
were able to ascertain and identify the place to be searched and 
the search was valid. This was the ruling of the trial judge who 
found: 
10. That as to the discrepancies in the 
precise description and address of the duplex 
to be searched, the Court finds the 
description was adequate, as was the address, 
and that the premises actually searched was 
[sic] in fact the premises in which Officer 
Brian observed Cathy Gartrell exit with very 
unique and distinguishable packages. 
(R. at 78, paragraph 10). As was argued in Point II above, this 
finding by the trial court should be accorded deference and not 
disturbed unless it was clearly erroneous. State v. Stromberg, 
121 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 23 (Utah Ct. App. November 8, 1989). 
The evidence presented at the suppression hearing 
regarding the address and the search was that Kathy Gartrell was 
observed traveling west on 3100 South ti> 2050 West, then turning 
south on 2050 West (R. Ill at 25). A short time later, Officer 
Brian also turned on 2050 West and went south until he saw 
Kathy's car parked "directly west of the 3215 South street" (R. 
Ill at 25). He later saw Kathy come out of the east duplex which 
he knew either to be 3216 or 3218 South from the addresses on the 
mailbox (R. Ill at 31-33). After an affidavit was prepared and a 
warrant obtained, Officer Brian returned to the duplex with other 
officers and verified their entry into the correct side of the 
duplex (R. Ill at 43 and 125). Clearly, then, the officers were 
able, with reasonable effort, to "ascertain and identify the 
place to be searched." Mclntire, 768 P.2d at 972. 
It was during trial that an explanation of the address 
discrepancy was given. When Officer Brian testified at trial, 
defense counsel asked him why he described the address as 2050 
West. Officer Brian replied: 
In entering the subdivision from 3100 
South and making the coordinates which were 
given to me by way of radio by Detective Paul 
Rapp as 2050 West, I turned on 2050 West, 
showing street coordinates on the corners of 
the first three blocks, or first two blocks, 
as 2050 West, and then trying to obtain the 
exact location of the vehicle. After my west 
coordinate was made, I then proceeded south, 
in trying to locate that, setting my 
coordinate with that 2050. 
(R. 112 at 84). While this statement by Officer Brian is not 
exactly clear, it appears that the street was 2050 West at 3100 
South but became 2040 West at the location of 3215 South. It is 
not clear from the record whether the street had a small turn or 
if the number merely was adjusted. Either explanation is a 
West and a 2040 West could not exist as separate streets on the 
same southern coordinate. 
Given the evidence presented to the trial court, the 
court was correct in finding that the address listed in the 
affidavit was adequate to allow the officers with reasonable 
effort to identify the place to be searched. Anderson, 701 P.2d 
at 1102. The testimony established that the officers searched 
the residence from which Kathy Gartrell emerged and the 
"hypertechnicality" of the difference between 2050 West and 2040 
West does not invalidate the search warrant. State v. Hansen, 
732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987). 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL AMPLY 
SUPPORTS THE JURY'S VERDICT CONVICTING 
DEFENDANT. 
Finally, defendant claims that the evidence presented 
at trial does not support the jury's verdict convicting him of 
distribution of a controlled substance. The appellate courts of 
this state have repeatedly articulated the standard of review on 
appeal when the argument concerns sufficiency of the evidence. 
The appellate courts accord great deference to the jury verdict. 
It is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence 
and determine the credibility of the witnesses. "[T]he 'Court 
should only interfere when . . . reasonable men could not 
possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.'" 
State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(quoting State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980)). 
Furthermore, defendant has the burden of establishing "that the 
evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime." State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 
(Utah 1980). See also State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 
1989). The courts have succinctly stated that, unless there is a 
clear showing of a lack of evidence, the jury verdict will be 
upheld. See Gabaldon, 735 P.2d at 412. 
Inherent in a defendant's burden to establish the 
inconclusiveness or insubstantiality of the evidence under 
Kerekes is an obligation to marshal all of the evidence which 
supports the jury verdict, then show that the evidence is 
insufficient. In Cambelt International Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 
1239 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court reiterated that: 
We consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, and we will not 
overturn that verdict when it is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. Von Hake 
v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). 
"To successfully attack the verdict, an 
appellant must marshall [sic] all the 
evidence supporting their verdict and then 
demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to that verdict, 
the evidence is insufficient to support it." 
Id. 
Cambelt, 745 P.2d at 1242. Commenting on that quotation, the 
Court added a footnote in which it said: 
In Scharf v. BMG Corp.f, 700 P.2d 1068 
(Utah 1985)], we stated this standard of 
review as it then applied with respect to 
findings of fact entered in a judge-tried 
civil matter. The promulgation of Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure 52(a), which mandates that 
a trial judge's findings of fact "shall not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous," 
alters this standard somewhat in judge-tried 
cases. Still, the standard has continuing 
validity in regard to a jury's factual 
findings. 
Cambelt, 745 P.2d at 1242, n. 1. While these cases are civil 
rather than criminal, the standard is the same for criminal 
cases. The applicability of Rule 52(a) to criminal matters was 
explained in State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-93 (Utah 1987), 
and the same standard of viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdict is also well established in criminal 
procedure. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d at 412. In another civil case, 
the Utah Supreme Court, quoting State v. Walker, recently 
reiterated the obligation of appellant to marshal the evidence in 
support of the jury's verdict, then challenge the finding. In re 
Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
Obviously the burden of proof is different between 
criminal and civil cases, but that standard does not affect 
defendant's obligation to marshal all of the facts supporting the 
jury verdict before attempting to demonstrate that the evidence 
is insufficient. 
In his brief, defendant mentions some facts which were 
adduced at trial but only provides a record cite for one 
statement by a prosecution witness. Defendant fails to include 
other evidence which was presented to the jury and which 
abundantly supports the verdict. The evidence before the jury 
was that Kevin and Kathy Gartrell, defendant's brother and 
sister-in-law, had sold cocaine to Les Dowdle, who was working 
with the Narcotics Strike Force (R. 112 at 21-39, 102, and 157). 
Based on that fact, the officers had set up another purchase, 
using money the serial numbers of which had been recorded by the 
officers (R. 112 at 40-42). 
As arranged, Dowdle gave the money to Kathy Gartrell in 
Farmington; she then travelled south on 1-15 into the Salt Lake 
City area, followed by officers (R. 112 at 195-96 and 44-46). 
Instead of going to the apartment building that she had gone to 
during one of the previous purchases, when she had also been 
followed, she left the interstate on 21st South and travelled 
west (R. 112 at 46). She travelled to 3216-3218 South 2040 West 
in West Valley City, Utah, where Officer Brian eventually saw her 
car parked (R. 112 at 52). Also parked at the duplex was a 
vehicle registered to defendant (R. 112 at 92-93). After nearly 
an hour, Officer Brian saw Kathy leaving the east duplex with 
three bags (R. 112 at 52). As had been previously arranged, 
Kathy telephoned Dowdle about 27 minutes before she left the 
duplex and told him that she had the cocaine {R. 112 at 49-50 and 
196-97) . 
While Kathy was at the duplex, Mark Mori arrived to 
give defendant some money that he owed him (R. 112 at 102 and 
105)). Mori walked into the back room where he saw defendant 
weighing out cocaine on a triple-beam scale into individual bags 
(R. 112 at 102-103). He never actually saw defendant hand the 
drugs to Kathy, but he did see Kathy put a scale into a red 
diaper bag and then leave, carrying the bag (R. 112 at 104). 
Officer Brian saw Kathy carrying three bags as she left 
the duplex (R. 112 at 52). The red and green bags were placed in 
the trunk of Kathy's car and a blue bag was placed in the front 
with the children (R. 112 at 52). Kathy drove back to Farmington 
but noticed Officer Rapp following her and warned Dowdle and 
defendant that she thought she had been followed by the police 
(R. 112 at 198 and 107). She made her way back to the interstate 
and was arrested by the officers at the Centerville exit (R. 112 
at 136 and 55). In the red bag in the trunk of Kathy's car 
officers found a triple-beam scale and a plastic baggy with 
approximately one quarter ounce of cocaine (R, 112 at 56, 96, and 
138-39). 
Based on this information, the officers obtained a 
search warrant for the east duplex at 3 216-3218 South 2040 West, 
West Valley, Utah (the warrant was for 2050 West, but that 
discrepancy was addressed in Point III above) (R. 112 at 140). 
During the search, Officer Rapp looked through a closet in the 
bedroom of the residence; this closet contained male clothing 
only (R. 112 at 141-42). As the officer was removing an item 
from one of the hangers, a "large amount of cash" fell from 
another clothing item in the closet (R. 112 at 142). This cash 
amounted to $6600.00 (R. 112 at 145). Also in the closet was a 
"Mazatlan T shirt" in the front pouch of which the officer found 
another sum of cash in the amount of $1150.00 (R. 112 at 143-44). 
Officer Brian later went through this money retrieved from the 
bedroom and found $220.00 of the money which had been given to 
Kathy by Dowdle for the purchase of cocaine; the rest of the 
recorded buy money was found in Kathy's possession (R. 112 at 
66). 
Mori's testimony verified that defendant lived at 3216 
South 2040 West. Mori testified that he had known defendant for 
approximately one year and the defendant lived at the duplex 
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where Kathy arrived on March 30, 1988 (R. 112 at 101-102). Mori 
had purchased cocaine from defendant in the past and had gone to 
defendant's residence to pay for cocaine received in the past (R. 
112 at 112). After the search was conducted, defendant 
telephoned Mori and said that his house had been raided, but that 
he had been next door because he had been warned by Kathy that 
the police had followed her (R. 112 at 105-107). 
The evidence presented at trial then, showed that Kathy 
told Dowdle that she was going to the Salt Lake area to obtain 
the cocaine and would telephone him after she received it. That 
telephone call was made while Kathy was in the east duplex at 
3216 South 2040 West, West Valley City. Defendant was seen 
measuring out cocaine in the presence o£ Kathy and Kathy was seen 
leaving defendant's residence with a red diaper bag. Officers 
found a scale and cocaine in the red diaper bag in the trunk of 
Kathy's car. Part of the recorded buy money was found in 
defendant's residence and defendant told Mori that he had been 
warned by Kathy that she had been followed. With that warning, 
defendant had gone next door and hidden while the officers 
searched his residence. Clearly the verdict of the jury is 
abundantly supported by the evidence and reasonable inferences 
from that evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Szate respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction, 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this f| day of January, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailedr postage prepaid, 
to David Paul White, Attorney for Defendant, 144 South 500 East, 
4-1 Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, this // — day of January, 1990. 
A/'-v^.P ^ :t^ 1:\>^> 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
Courthouse 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: 4 51-3 2 27 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
: AFFIDAVIT FOR 
In Re: Search of the 
apartment located in a 
duplex described as the 
East unit of the duplex 
with an address of either 
3216 or 3218 South 2050 
West, West Valley City and 
occupied by Troy Gartrell 
SEARCH WARRANT 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) ss: 
Before (, Circuit Court Judge, the 
undersigned, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he has 
probable cause to believe that on the premises which are 
described as: 
apartment located in a 
duplex described as the 
East unit of the duplex 
with an address of either 
3216 or 3218 South 2050 
West West Valley City and 
occupied by Troy Gartrell 
there is now certain property described as: 
Controlled Substances 
oooc 
mail Uitf "Wil^ftnmvwWWlW 
S i ^ T f ^ ' " « « * » « * - # b o o k . , p i c t u r e , i r ^ c ^ i ^ ^ . «**-
other written material evidencing sales or 
distribution of controlled substances 
Monies, securities, currency or other items of 
value used in the sale or distribution of 
controlled substances 
Identification cards, records, accounts books, 
pictures, receipts, personal property or other 
items evidencing ownership, occupation or 
control of the above premises or rooms therein, 
The facts to establish the issuance of this warrant are 
as follows: 
1. That affiant is an investigator with the Davis Metro 
Narcotic Task Force and is familiar with the facts presented 
herein. 
2. That on or about the 29th day of March, 1988, 
affiant made contact with Confidential Informant at which 
time, the Confidential Informant made a phone call to Kevin and 
Cathey Gartrell at their home in Farmington. 
3. That at that time, Confidential Informant made 
arrangements with Kevin and Cathey to purchase 1/4 ounce of 
Cocaine such arrangements being that Confidential Informant would 
deliver the money to Cathey Gartrell on the following day, and 
she would then run to the home of her dealer, pick up the 
cocaine and return it to Confidential Informant. 
4. That said conversation was recorded and monitored 
by affiant, 
5. That on the 30th day of March, 1988, under the 
supervision of affiant, Confidential Informant did then deliver a 
sum of money to Cathey Gartrell as had been arranged. 
6 . T h a t a t t h e t i m e t h e C o n f i d e n t i a l I n f o r m a n t
 g a V e 
Cathey Gartrell the money, Confidential Informant requested that 
she call Confidential Informant before she left her dealers home 
and let Confidential Informant know whether she had obtained the 
cocaine or not. 
7* That after the money was delivered, affiant and Paul 
Rapp then followed the automobile driven by Cathey Gartrell into 
the Salt Lake area. 
8. That affiant observed Cathey Gartrell drive directly 
to a duplex located at 3218 South 2050 West, West Valley City, 
Utah and that affiant was able to observe her the whole way and 
the only stop she made was at a gas station in Farmington, Utah 
wh«re she filled her car with gas. 
9. That upon arriving at the above address, affiant 
observed Cathey's vehicle parked in the driveway of the above 
described duplex and that this was 12:55 p.m. 
10. Statement from Officer Llyod Killpack that at 1:29 
p.m. he monitored a phone call from Cathey 
Gartrell to the Confidential Informant in which Cathey indicated 
that she had obtained the cocaine and that she was on the way 
back to deliver it to Confidential Informant. 
11. That at 1:56 p.m. affiant observed Cathey Gartrell 
leave the east unit of the above described duplex and place a red 
bag in the trunk of her car, and then enter her vehicle. 
12. That affiant was unable to obtain the exact number 
of .the east unit but was able to observe that one unit was 
number 3218 and one 3216. 
iinnnAU 
*«» • S t a t e m e n t from o f f i c e r T>J*H*I T»*»^*-* *.*«_«- ~~^ 
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Gartrell entered her vehicle she then left the area and he 
was again able to follow her directly back to her home in 
Fannington without making any stops. 
14. Statement from Officer Lloyd Killpack that he was 
maintaining survallence of Cathey Gartrell's home and-observed 
her^arriyerat/ the home at which time she met briefly with a male 
individual at which time she got back.into her vehicle and left. 
15. Statement from Paul Rapp that he observed Cathey 
Gartrell leave her home in Farmington and after stopping for a 
short time In the parking lot of the Davis County Municipal Court 
Building enter the 1-15 freeway heading south. 
18 • That at that time, Cathey Gartrell's vehicle was 
stopped in the area of Centerville and she was placed under 
arrest. 
19. That a search of her vehicle was made incident to 
arrest at which time a red bag was found in the trunk of her car 
Which-cohtained a set of scales and a baggie containing about 1/4 
ounce of white powder which based on affiant experience and 
training is believed to be cocaine. 
20. That also located in the vehicle was a large 
quantity of marijuana. 
21. That after Cathey Gartrell was placed under arrest 
she was advised of her miranda rights which she waived and 
thereupon spoke with affiant. 
22* 
WHEREFORE, affiant prays that a search warrant be issued 
for the search of the above-described r>r^< 
escribed premises and the seizure
 Df 
any of the said items. 
7^ J* • 
Subscribed and sworn to me t h i s ^{? M^A. 1988, 
CI?? 
r F 
W 
-Jul l Y / ' • 0 * * ~ . ^ _ V ' 6 * y , 
-^w 
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ADDENDUM B 
Steven V, Major 
Davis County Attorney's Office 
Courthouse 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: 451-3227 
ra*r ^UfeTwier COURT 
Third Judicial District 
FEB 1 6 1989 
Q^rfe 
7 Deputy CVk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TROY GARTRELL, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. CR88-1561 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing before 
the Honorable Judge Pat B. Brian on the 6th day of February, 
1989, the Plaintiff was present and represented by Steven V. 
Major, Deputy Davis County Attorney, and the Defendant was 
present and represented by William Lindsley. The Court having 
reviewed all of the exhibits submitted by the parties, having 
heard the testimony, read the memorandum submitted by counsel, 
reviewed the case law, and being fully informed makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS Q£ FACT 
1. That-the Defendant's motion to suppress raises 
fundamental questions of fact and law. Succinctly stated, the 
competing interests are the right of the defendant to be free 
State or Community to protect, through law enforcement, people 
from those who traffic in illicit drugs and narcotics. 
2. That the courts have historically favored searches 
by warrant. The question before this Court inasmuch as there is 
a warrant present, is whether or not the affidavit in support of 
the warrant was adequate to provide the magistrate who reviewed 
the affidavit to declare that there was probable cause to search 
the premises in question and to seize evidence set forth in the 
warrant. 
3. That the Court must then focus its attention on the 
question, if there were false, inaccurate or misleading 
statements made by the affiant to the magistrate, were those 
inaccurate and false and misleading statements of such magnitude 
that had the magistrate known of them he would not have issued a 
search warrant. 
4. That as to the surveillance of Cathy Gartrell on 
March 30, 1988 from the time she left Farmington, Utah to West 
Valley, Utah and then back to Farmington, there is no question in 
the Court's mind that the surveillance was not continuous and 
uninterrupted; that for brief periods of time the vehicle which 
Cathy Gartrell was traveling in was out of eyesight of the 
officers. 
5. That the times and the circumstances under which 
the surveillance was interrupted were so brief and so out of 
context with the overall events that were occurring that Cathy 
Gartrell would not have had opportunity to go elsewhere in those 
brief periods of time for the purpose of picking up drugs and 
narcotics. 
6. That as to the question of the prior arrest and 
pending matter before the Court as indicated in the handwritten 
material on the back of the statement given to Judge Taylor in 
support of the search warrant, if the statement is read in 
context, it indicates that the defendant had previously been 
arrested for an offense involving narcotics and, as a result a 
diversion agreement, that matter was still pending, 
7. That in light of the testimony given, there were 
certain conditions of the diversion agreement to which the 
defendant was ordered to comply. The Court finds that the 
defendant did not comply and that the statement given to the 
Judge by the affiant was not misleading. 
8. That as to the omissions to the magistrate 
regarding prior illicit drug and narcotic activity by Cathy 
Gartrell, Kevin Gartrell, and others who were tangentially 
involved in the arrest and the prosecution of the defendant in 
this case, and whether the magistrate had known about that, or 
not, the Court finds these facts would have had no bearing on the 
magistrate determining that there was probable cause for the 
warrant to be issued and a search to be conducted. 
9. That as to the allegation that officers did not 
observe the defendant at the address where the search was 
conducted on or near March 30, 1988, whether defendant was 
personally observed or not has no bearing on whether or not 
there was probable cause for those premises to be searched and 
valid and that the defendant's motion to suppress is denied. 
DATED this /^T day of February, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
Z^*=3_ 
HONORABLE JUDGE^PftT-BT'BRIAN 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, with postage 
prepaid thereon, to William Lindsley, Attorney at Law, 505 South 
Main, Bountiful UT 84010 this /%. day of February, 1989. 
Secretary 
seized. 
10. That as to the discrepancies in the precise 
description and address of the duplex to be searched, the Court 
finds the description was adequate, as was the address, and that 
the premises actually searched was in fact the premises in which 
Officer Brian observed Cathy Gartrell exit with very unique and 
distinguishable packages. 
11. That the packages were placed in the car and that 
the car was under constant surveillance until it was stopped 
sometime later, at which time the packages were taken from the 
trunk, and in the packages were the illicit drugs and narcotics. 
12. That as to the issue of seizing property which may 
or may not be admissible, the Court finds that the officer may 
seize what he believes to be admissible evidence and that at some 
later time and place the Court will determine whether or not the 
officer's assessment is correct or incorrect. 
13. That as to the allegation of surprise, the fact 
that the police officers may have preliminary focused on one 
residence in Murray and then ultimately focused on another 
residence in West Valley City has absolutely nothing to do with 
whether or not the affidavit was adequate to authorize the 
issuance of a valid search warrant by the issuing magistrate. 
CONCLUSIONS Of LAW 
1. That the Court in each of the matters finds that 
the information provided to the issuing magistrate proved 
adequate; that the warrant was lawful; that the execution of the 
warrant, to extent of the matters brought before this Court, was 
